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Conflict of Laws: Trusts: Jurisdiction Over Foreign Testamentary Trusts:
Erdheim v. Mabee, 305 N. Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953).-Plaintiffs
were judgment creditors of defendant. In this action they sought to garnish
trust income payable to the judgment debtor. The trust had been set up
pursuant to a will probated in the District of Columbia. In 1931 the trustees
settled the first account in the District of Columbia probate court. Included
in the decree of settlement was a provision retaining jurisdiction for such
orders and instructions regarding the administration of the trust estate as
might be deemed necessary.
Defendant claimed that a New York court had no power to garnish the
trust, asserting that exclusive jurisdiction was retained by the District of
Columbia. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York does possess
jurisdiction to garnish. The court held that the situs of the trust was in New
York since the trust was actively being administered by a New York trust
company. Moreover, the court took the position that even if the situs were in
the District of Columbia, there still would be no lack of power in the New
York courts to garnish funds within the territorial limits of New York. If
exclusive jurisdiction for the administration of the trust was retained by the
District of Columbia this would not prevent garnishment by a New York court
since garnishment does not relate to the administration of the trust. Two
judges dissented, questioning the advisability of subjecting the trustees to
instructions which might not be approved by the court of probate in the District
of Columbia. They did not seem, however, to dispute New York's power to
exercise jurisdiction.
CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT
Generally, the court which probates a will containing trust provisions retains
continuing jurisdiction over both the trustees and the trust res. This jurisdiction
has been termed in rem by one court;' several term it quasi-in-rem.2 The
theory of these decisions is that the trust res is constructively in the control of
the probate court, such control being equivalent to a sheriff's attachment for
jurisdictional purposes. If the trust res consists of personalty, it is immaterial
that the res is physically outside the jurisdiction since the situs of personalty
follows the domicile of the owner.3 The jurisdiction of the probate court over
the trustees also has been adjudged to be in personam, even though the trustee
had not been personally served within the jurisdiction. This in personam
jurisdiction has been based on the ground that testamentary trustees are
officers of the court.4 In jurisdictions where the trustee is not considered to be
an officer of the court, the exercise of in personar jurisdiction has been held to
be valid without service of process, since the trustee has impliedly consented
to appear whenever called by the court.6 As a precautionary measure the court
should direct the trustee to appoint the clerk of the court, or some other official,
1 Letcher's Trustee v. German National Bank, 134 Ky. 24, 119 S. W. 236 (1909).
2 Boone v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 163 F.2d 809 (D. C. Cir. 1947); Farmer's
and Mechanic's Savings Bank v. Brewer, 27 Conn. 600 (1858); Chase v. Chase, 84 Mass.
101 (1861); Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98 Pac. 497 (1908); Swetland v. Swetland,
105 N. J. Eq. 608, 149 Atl. 50 (Ch. 1930); Smith v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., 12 App.
Div. 278, 42 N.Y. Supp. 740 (1st Dep't 1896), aff'd, 154 N.Y. 333, 48 N.E. 553 (1897).
3 Boone v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 163 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
4 Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
5 Michigan Trust Co. v. Perry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
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as the trustee's agent to accept service of process.6 In New York such an
appointment is required by statute.7
The probate court's judgment will be entitled to full faith and credit under
all of these theories.8 However, if a court purported to retain exclusive juris-
diction over future controversies arising out of a testamentary trust, the decree
to that effect might not be entitled to full faith and credit.9 Unlike an executor,
a trustee holds legal title to the trust res and may sue on behalf of the trust in
any jurisdiction.' 0 There is, however, much conflict in the cases as to the
circumstances under which one may sue a testamentary trustee in a court
other than the court of probate.
FOp.EIGN- JURISDICTIoN OvER TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS OF REALTY
A court of equity exercising its in personam jurisdiction has ordered a
testamentary trustee to convey realty which is located in another jurisdiction."
Such a decree must presumably be accorded full faith and credit only if the
defendant obeys it.12 If the decree is not enforced within the jurisdiction, or if
the conveyance is executed by an officer of the court, it is not entitled to full
faith and credit under the Constitution, nor is it res judicata. 13 However, as a
matter of local law, the court at the situs of the land may hold that such an
in personam decree will be given full faith and credit, 14 or be considered res
judicata.'r
To avoid difficulties in enforcement, New York has held that it is without
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a testamentary trust affecting lands
in California.' 6 On the other hand, a New York court in an action relating to
the administration of a trust which involved New York realty has claimed to
be without jurisdiction, holding that the only appropriate forum was Massachu-
setts where the will had been probated.1 7 The cases may be distinguished in
that no question of title to the land was involved in the latter case.
Similarly, it has been held that a substituted testamentary trustee appointed
by a court acquires no title to real property outside the court's jurisdiction
6 Land, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws, 266 n. 26 (1940).
7 N.Y. Surr. Court Act § 167.
8 Boone v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 163 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
9 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W.2d 165 (1938).
10 Toronto General Trust Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 123 N.Y. 37, 25 N.E. 198
(1890).
11 Jones v. Jones, 8 Misc. 660, 30 N.Y. Supp 177 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1894). See
also the following cases involving equitable conversion: Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (U.S.
1810) ; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.Y. 327 (1860); Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444
(1750).
12 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33, 161 N.E. 321
(1928).
13 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); Bullock
v. Bullock, 52 N.J. Eq. 561, 30 At. 676 (Ct. Err. & App. 1894). The same rule prevails in
Canada. Duke v. Andler [1932] S.C.R. 734.
14 MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65 (1859) ; Virginia v. Levy, 23 Gratt. 21 (Va. 1873).
15 Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873).
16 Knox v. Jones, 47 N.Y. 389 (1872). Accord, Matter of Osborne, 151 Misc. 52, 270
N.Y. Supp. 616 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1934). Contra: Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis.
486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927).
17 Matter of Bradford's Estate, 165 Misc. 736, 1 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1937).
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without ancillary proceedings in the state of the situs.18 However, a New York
court has gone to the extreme of removing a trustee of an Illinois testamentary
trust from his position even though part of the trust res consisted of real
property in Illinois. 19 The decision is justified because of the gross misconduct
of the trustee. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the judgment was entitled to full
faith and credit unless the trustee actually executed a conveyance. A decree,
standing alone, or a conveyance executed by the sheriff is of no effect unless
the court of the state in which the realty is located chooses to recognize it.20
Where an action is brought against a testamentary trustee of realty and no
issue is raised as to title, the same considerations should apply as in testamen-
tary trusts of personalty.
FoREIGN JURISDICTION OVER TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY
Where the court of probate has not retained jurisdiction, any other court of
competent jurisdiction in another state2 ' may entertain a suit against a testa-
mentary trustee.22 But where the court of probate retains jurisdiction over the
trustee and trust res there is a conflict of authority as to the conditions under
which a foreign court will exercise jurisdiction. The courts of Massachusetts
have long taken the view that they have no authority to hear a suit against a
testamentary trustee if a probate court of another state retains jurisdiction,
even where both trustee and trust res are in Massachusetts and the action is
for a sum of money only. 3 In a more recent case the rule has been modified
by a holding that Massachusetts will take jurisdiction if the testator has
shown an intent to have the trust administered in Massachusetts. 24
The New York cases do not follow the Massachusetts view, though it has
been approved in some lower court decisions. These decisions are sustainable
on other grounds. 2 5 In Erdheim v. Mabee the New York Court of Appeals
held directly against the Massachusetts rule, allowing garnishment of a testa-
mentary trust which was being administered under the direction of the courts
of the District of Columbia.2" The decisions clearly seem justified. The
18 Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464 (U.S. 1871); West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425 (1884);
De Lashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 412, 169 S.W. 34 (1914). Contra: Hoysradt v. Tionesta
Gas Co., 194 Pa. 251, 45 Atl. 62 (1900).
19 Jones v. Jones, 8 Misc. 660, 30 N.Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1894).
20 See notes 12, 13 and 14 supra.
21 In New York, a suit on a foreign trust must be brought in the Supreme Court.
The Surrogate's court has no jurisdiction. People ex rel Stafford v. Surrogate's Court, 229
N.Y. 495, 128 N.E. 890 (1920).
22 Strawn v. Caffee, 235 Ala. 218, 178 So. 430 (1938); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass.
235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Ferris, 67 App. Div. 1, 73 N.Y.
Supp. 475 (1st Dep't 1901); In re Turner's Will, 195 Misc. 331, 90 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1949); Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 37 Misc. 256, 75 N.Y.
Supp. 294 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 179 N.Y. 486, 72 N.E.
508 (1904); Schwartz v. Gerhardt, 44 Ore. 425, 75 Pac. 698 (1901).
23 Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355 (1881).
24 Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920).
25 Everhart v. Provident Life and Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 118 Misc. 852, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 388 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922) (trustee was a non-resident, trust corpus was in
Pennsylvania, testator had been a non-resident). In re Matthew's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 662
(Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1949) (the issues raised had already been decided by the Fennsyl-
vania court).
28 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953).
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judgment could be enforced only in New York where th corpus was located.
Moreover, the decree of garnishment is entitled to full faith and credit if the
funds are actually garnished within the jurisdiction of the court.2 7 These
factors make New York the logical and convenient forum for the action. For
many years the lower courts of New York have been anticipating this decision,
exercising or withholding jurisdiction depending on whether New York was the
convenient forum for the action. Often, however, the opinions are written in
terms of the presence or absence of jurisdictional power.2 8 New York has
shown much resourcefulness in asserting jurisdiction or refusing to do so, and
also in recognizing the decrees of ,other jurisdictions or rejecting them. The
holding in every case depends on criteria such as whether the decree is enforce-
able within the jurisdiction, whether the testator or trustees were domiciliaries
of New York, whether there is a more convenient forum elsewhere and whether
justice demands the court's intervention.
The lower courts of New York have declined jurisdiction when there was no
other contact with New York save that the trustee was doing some business in
the state.2 9 However, even where the presence of the trustee was the only
contact, they have exercised jurisdiction where the trustee was guilty of mis-
conduct.30 In one old case even where no misconduct was involved a substituted
trustee has been appointed where only the cestui que trust was in New York
but great hardship would have resulted if the parties were sent back to the
probate court.31
Where the funds were in New York and the trustees never accounted to
their probate court, New York has appointed a substitute for a deceased
trustee.3 2 Prior to the decision in Erdheim v. Mabee, New York courts have
taken jurisdiction to garnish testamentary trusts,3 3 even where the garnishment
was for the collection of a foreign alimony decree,3 4 when both funds and trustee
were in New York. They have construed a British will and have appointed a
substituted trustee under it where the trust res was in New York.35 In most of
thaese cases some degree of control of administration appears to have been
retained by foreign courts of probate, but grounds of convenience pressed the
court into exercising its discretion to take jurisdiction.
Following similar principles, where the corpus was in New York, and testator
died domiciled in New York, the courts of New York refused to recognize
the appointment by a Swedish court of a trustee ineligible under New York
27 Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935). Probably jurisdiction over the garnishee
would be sufficient for a valid garnishment. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
28 See note 25 supra.
29 See, e.g., Everhart v. Provident Life and Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 118 Misc. 852,
195 N.Y.Supp. 388 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922).
30 Jones v. Jones, 8 Misc. 660, 30 N.Y.Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1894). For
similar considerations see La Vin v. La Vin, 179 Misc. 1000, 39 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1943), aff'd without opinion, 266 App. Div. 674, 41 N.Y.S.2d 180 (2d
Dep't 1943); Squier v. Houghton, 131 Misc. 129, 226 N.Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1927).
31 Curtis v. Smith, 6 Blatchf. 537 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1869).
32 Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 37 Misc. 256, 75 N.Y. Supp. 294 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 179 N.Y. 486, 72 N.E. 508 (1904).
33 Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N.Y. Supp.' 728 (Ist Dep't 1902).
34 Braman v. Braman, 236 App. Div. 164, 258 N.Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dep't 1932).
35 In re Morris' Will, 197 Misc. 322, 97 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
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law,36 and rejected a British decree ordering dissolution of a New York trust.37
These decisions appear correct since in the first case the only contact between
Sweden and the trust was the domicile of the cestui que trust and in the second
case the only contact with Britain was the presence in Britain of creditors of
the cestui que trust. In contrast to these decisions, where the testator dies a
domiciliary of another state New York has given full faith and credit to that
state's decisions regarding the trust although the funds and trustees were in
New York.88 Presumably, a decree of a foreign country would also be recog-
nized if testator were a domiciliary of that country or if part of the trust res
were located there. 9
It is apparent from the cases that there is no lack of jurisdictional power
to render judgment against a trustee of a foreign testamentary trust. Where
the action is for a sum of money and the funds are within the territorial limits
and are levied upon, the decree is entitled to full faith and credit. 40 Under such
circumstances jurisdiction will be exercised if the forum is not manifestly
inconvenient. Where the court is called upon to take jurisdiction for purposes
other than to render a judgment for a sum of money, a more stringent test
should be applied. Except under compelling circumstances no testamentary
trustee should be forced to account to or follow the direction of more than one
court.
Difficulties arise where two courts concurrently attempt to control the
administration of a trust. In Ewing v. Ewing4' at the request of one of the
cestui que trust an English court ordered the trustees under a Scottish will to
account to the English court and to administer the funds according to its
directions. In the meantime the Scottish probate court sequestered the funds
and enjoined the trustees from accounting to any court outside of Scotland.
The House of Lords on appeal reached the surprising result that both judgments
were valid with the exception of the injunction against accounting to the
English court. As a result the trustees were put in the distressing position
of executing the possibly inconsistent instructions of two courts at some distance
from each other. Their only consolation was that the Lords did not believe
that the courts would be unreasonable in their directions.
Where the problem has arisen in the United States more sensible results have
been reached. California has refused jurisdiction for an accounting where an
accounting was pending on appeal from the probate court of Arizona. 42 How-
ever, in another case where no action was pending in the probate court of
Illinois, the California court took jurisdiction on the ground that California
had secondary jurisdiction which could be exercised when Illinois was not
exercising her primary jurisdiction.43 Except in cases of fraud or similar
equitable considerations, this result is not entirely desirable. Certainly, the
result which involves the least'doubt and circuity of action was reached in
Equitable Trust Co. v. Schwebel.44 The United States District Court for the
36 In re Fermer's Will, 177 Misc. 228, 30 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Surr. Ct. Bronx County 1941).
37 In re Havemeyer's Estate, 127 Misc. 197, 216 N.Y. Supp. 334 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1926).
38 Smith v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., 12 App. Div. 278, 42 N.Y. Supp. 740 (1st Dep't
1896), aff'd, 154 N.Y. 333, 48 N.E. 553 (1897).
39 Schwartz v. Gerhardt, 44 Ore. 425, 75 Pac. 698 (1904).
40 Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935).
41 [1885] L. R. 10 A. C. 453.
42 Schuster v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 619, 277 Pac. 509 (1929).
43 Estate of Knox, 52 Cal. App.2d 338, 126 P.2d 108 (1942).
44 40 F.Supp. 112 (ED. Pa. 1941).
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the trustee to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the New Jersey court where an accounting was pending. A similar
result was reached in Marsh v. Marsh.45 The New Jersey court stayed a pro-
ceeding for an accounting until a New York accounting proceeding was settled.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides that "the administration of
the trust is supervised by the courts of that state only in which the administra-
tion of the trust is located."48 Other provisions define the state of administra-
tion as meaning the state of the trustee's domicile. 47 The Restatement rule is
desirable as a goal, but is too inflexible for our federal system. In the instances
where the Restatement scheme has been followed, the results are laudable.
An example is the case of In re Shipman's Will.4 In 1898 testator's will was
probated in New York. A Massachusetts Trust company was named testa-
mentary trustee. Through ancillary proceeding the Massachusetts court took
over the administration of the entire trust. In 1942, action was brought in the
probate court of New York for an accounting. The New York court held that
Massachusetts was the appropriate forum for the suit. The result clearly seems
proper. The Massachusetts court had become familiar with the trust adminis-
tration, and the administration of the trust would be governed by Massachusetts
law.49 Moreover, the trustees would not be beset with the onerous burden of
defending suits far from the situs of their duties, possibly at the expense of the
trust itself.
In the usual case, however, the probate court retains jurisdiction over the
administration of the trust even though the trustee is to be a foreign trust
company. An example of this practice appears in Cronin's Case,50 where a trust
was set up under the will of a New York domiciliary which had been probated
in New York. A Pennsylvania trust company was named trustee. The Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania brought suit in the Pennsylvania courts to dissolve
the trust and to levy on the entire res. The highest court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which had held for the Common-
wealth, but stayed execution of the lower court's judgment until the Common-
wealth appeared in the New York court to determine if it was entitled to the
judgment. If the New York court were to hold the same way as the Pennsylva-
nia court had, the Commonwealth would be allowed to apply to the Pennsyl-
vania court for execution. Thus Pennsylvania refused to follow the Restate-
ment, recognizing that the trustee would be placed in the difficult position of
responding to the possibly inconsistent demands of two courts if the restate-
ment rule were followed. It bowed instead to the continuing jurisdiction of
the New York court. Had New York released its jurisdiction, the Restatement
view could have been followed with the same desirable results as were
obtained in In re Shipman's. Will,51 or if the action merely had been for the
collection of a debt a different result probably would have been reached.
To facilitate the problems of administration, a foreign trustee should be
45 73 N.J. Eq. 99, 67 AtI. 706 (Ch. 1907). Contrast with Rosenbaum v. Garret, 57
NJ. Eq. 186, 41 AtI. 252 (Ch. 1898) (the court refused to stay proceeding in New Jersey,
even though a prior action was pending in Pennsylvania).
45 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 299 (1934).
4"7 Id. §§ 298, 299, comment a (1934).
48 179 Misc. 303, 40 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Surr. Ct. Queens County 1942).
49 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 298 (1934).
50 326 Pa. 343, 192 At. 397 (1943). Another typical example is the principal case,
Erdheim v. Mabee, 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953).
51 179 Misc. 303, 40 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Surr. Ct. Queens County 1942).
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able to ask permission of the probate court to transfer the administration of
the trust to a competent court in his jurisdiction. Where such permission has
not been requested, or has been refused, foreign courts should proceed with
caution before taking jurisdiction for purposes of administration, accounting, or
appointment of substituted trustees. No court should take action which it
cannot enforce. Where justice demands some action it would be wise to follow
the lead of the Equitable Trust Co. v. Schwebe 5 2 case and order the trustee to
appear in the appropriate court of another jurisdiction. However, more
boldness should be (and has been) exercised where the relief prayed for is a
money judgment which may be satisfied within the jurisdiction. In these latter
cases the weight of the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution lies behind the court's decree and there is no possibility that the
trustee will be faced with the hardship of relitigating the same issues in the
probate court.
Joseph M. Periilo, Jr.
Evidence: Constitutional Law: Determination of the Admissibility of
Confessions: Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 (1953) .All courts condemn
coerced confessions and agree without question that no man shall be convicted
by their use. Nevertheless courts have encountered considerable difficulty in
deciding certain specific problems. What is coercion? Who determines when a con-
fession is coerced, judge or jury? What weight should this determination in the
first instance be given in appellate court review? These questions were consid-
ered once again by the Supreme Court in the principal case where three men were
tried and convicted under the New York felony murder statute for the death
of an employee during the robbery of a Reader's Digest mail truck. The prose-
cution offered into evidence confessions of two of the accused over timely
objections that they were coerced.1 These confessions came after 12 hours of
intermittent interrogation stretched out over a 32-hour period, during which
time the accused were allowed to sleep and eat. The trial judge held that this
detention was in violation of the New York arraignment statute requiring the
officer making the arrest to take the accused before a committing magistrate
without undue delay.2 There was circumstantial evidence of violent treatment
of the defendants, but the record shows that the injuries could have been sus-
tained with equal probability before or after arrest. The state's evidence on
the issue of coercion was left almost unchallenged, because the defendants
chose to remain silent rather than to have their impressive criminal records
disclosed to the jury in the impeachment process.3
After a preliminary hearing in the presence of a jury, the trial judge deter-
mined that there was a fair question of fact on the issue of coercion and there-
fore the issue of coercion had to be determined by the jury. This is in ac-
52 40 F.Supp. 112 (EnD. Pa. 1941).
1 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395.
A confession of a defendant whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a pri-
vate person, can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear
produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney,
that he shall not be prosecuted therefore; but is not sufficient to warrant his con-
viction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed.
2 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 165.
8 When a defendant in New York takes the witness stand his credibility is subject
to attack. People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E. 538 (1916).
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